Food security bill

National Food Security Bill (referred to as NFSB in this report) is a proposed act which makes food availability a right for every citizen of India. The bill has come about after discussion amongst large number of stakeholders including right to food campaigners, National Advisory Council (NAC) and Government of India. There is a widespread agreement about the intension of the food security and a visibly clear gap about how to implement it.
In the following report, we will first analyse what the government’s bill is - followed by the changes that are necessary in our opinion and why this necessity arises. Towards the end of the report, we will see how Brazil implemented the food security for its citizens. As per assignment, section A of this report is required section B of the assignment and vice-versa. Section C of the report and the assignment is same.
Section A: A Critique of National Food Security Bill
NFSB that came out of deliberations of Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) is a watered down version of the food security bill proposed by National Advisory Council (NAC).
Even before we analyse the food security bill, it is indeed necessary to take a look at some starling numbers. The below poverty line population of India is still very high (37% as estimated by Tendulkar committee and 77% as estimated by Sengupta committee). Every 1 in 3 malnourished children lives in India. The child mortality rate because of hunger and huger-related diseases is very high (6000 deaths on an average day). 76% of the people in India do not get the daily required amount of calories, according to Professor Utsa Patnaik.
Contrast this situation against the record 220 billion Kg (160 Billion contributed by rice and wheat) of food production in the last year. It is nearly 15kg per person per month. Even with leakages and the provisions for future emergencies, it is still possible to provide EVERYONE with 7kg per person per month.

PROS:

1. Right to food to become a legal right- The proposed bill aims to provide legal right over subsidised foodgrain to 67 per cent of the population.
2. The bill provide uniform allocation of 5 kg foodgrain (per person) at fixed rate of Rs. 3 (rice), Rs. 2 (wheat) and Rs. 1 (coarse grains) per kg to 75 per cent of the rural population and 50 per cent of the poor in urban India – about 800 million people.
3. Continuance of Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) – Protection to 2.43 crore poorest of poor families under the Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) to supply of 35 kg foodgrains per month per family would continue.
4. Nutritional support to pregnant women without limitation are among other changes proposed in the bill. The bill will extend subsidized food to pregnant women and children under the age of 16. It is positive that it is including those who really need nutritious food The Bill proposes meal entitlements to specific groups. These include: pregnant women and lactating mothers, children between the ages of six months and 14 years, malnourished children, disaster affected persons, and destitute, homeless and starving persons.
5. For children in the age group of 6 months to 6 years, the Bill guarantees an age-appropriate meal, free of charge, through the local anganwadi. For children aged 6-14 years, one free mid-day meal shall be provided every day (except on school holidays) in all schools run by local bodies, government and government aided schools, up to Class VIII. For children below six months, “exclusive breastfeeding shall be promoted”.
6. Endevours to empower woman- The eldest woman in the household shall be entitled to secure food from the PDS for the entire household.    
7. Bill seeks to utilize already existing infrastructures like PDS and aganwadi’s. This has prevented further wastage of money to develop the infrastructures.

CONS:

1. Credibility of PDS system- The government intends to use the Public Distribution System for delivering subsidies to the poor.  The PDS is already used to deliver food subsidies to the poor but around 51% of the food delivered that way is currently lost to leakages. It is sold on the open market for a higher price.
2. The government is also considering using direct cash transfers. In cases where the government is not able to make food available in the PDS then they will give cash payments to be used for food directly into people’s bank accounts. I think here bill is deviating from its purpose. Bill is to provide access to food not money in lieu of food.

1. The cost of food grains is rising globally then how would government be able to provide subsidized food to 70% Indian population?
   1. What are we going to do in a drought or a flood? The production of rice and wheat might come down dramatically. If we are entering the global market then the global price would shoot up along with the subsidy bill. If this situation prevails and climate change takes, place what is going to happen?
   2. Effect on farmers and producers- The very low prices of the subsidized food will distort the market and farmers who can’t sell to the government-assured program will lose out on the open market because prices will be forced down. Hence the person who are not poor at present but will become poor in days to come.
   3. How to be implemented? Things are not very clear how it will be initiated. Every district will have a grievance officer who will deal with complaints about implementation at the local level. We don’t know how that will function but they have the authority to punish people who are not giving out the food. Still the commission under this bill is yet to be set.
   4. Failure to define the beneficiaries are some of the shortcomings of the bill. Also, the scheme does not define the beneficiaries properly. The bill says that States will provide the list of the poor but they have no such records. So, whether it will reach the right persons is hypothetical.
   5. Division among three groups – priority, general and excluded – and adopting a complex, impractical and politically contentious ‘inclusive’ criteria that too to be provided at later stage.
   6. Not enough resources- Moreover, to implement this scheme, the total estimated annual food grains requirements will be 61.23 million tones and is likely to cost Rs.1,24,724 crore. Given the rising costs of the scheme and rising population, its sustainability is under question. This is a mega program and will require a huge food subsidy.  The cost of it will go up from 0.8% of Gross Domestic Product to around 1.1% of GDP. This is a serious increase in a situation where the government does not have enough resources as it is.
   7. Based on schemes which are itself in trial stages- It will be linked to the Aadhar scheme which provides every citizen with a unique identification number that’s linked to a database that includes the biometrics of all card-holders. Aadhar scheme and direct cash transfer both are in their trial stages. So burdening an still developing programme will lead to total failure.
   8. Implementing this bill could widen the already swollen budget deficit next year, increasing the risk to its coveted investment-grade status. The government has already budgeted 900 billion rupees for the scheme in the current fiscal year ending March 2014. If the bill is passed, it will need to come up with as much as 1.3 trillion rupees in 2014/15, adding to a total subsidy burden that already eats up about 2.4 percent of gross domestic product.
   9. Critics say the food bill is little more than an attempt to help Congress, reeling from corruption scandals, win re-election in a vote expected by next May.
   10. Critics argue that eradication of malnutrition needs more than just removal of hunger. Food security is necessary but not sufficient for nutrition security.

SUGGESTIONS:

1. We should have learned lessons from the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (which provides 100 days of work to the poor at 100 rupees a day) and strengthened it to make it more effective to help the very poorest. Those who are part of that program should be targeted for this subsidy.
2. Or we could link it to education as they did in Bangladesh where school children and their families were given access to subsidized food.
3. The bill should have included subsidized rates for pulses which for many of the poorest are their only source of protein and highly nutritious. The price of pulses has gone up, making them out of reach for many.
4. We need to reduce the leakages from the distribution system and make it transparent. This bill has transparency provisions but do not provide how this transparency shall be achieved.
5. Community based agricultural programs and teaching about sustainable farming shall enhance production in the country. And this in turn would bring down the prices of various essential commodities and people can be self sufficient themselves. Relieance on government programs would reduce and this would give people a feeling of security and not fear of dependence.
6. For reducing loopholes in PDS system government must take lessons from Chattisgarh government where after the delivery is made to PDS branch, all the beneficiaries get a message though mobiles about the same, so they know about it and reach to PDS branch on time.
   

Will the relationship between India and Pakistan will ever improve ?

Indo-Pakistani relations are grounded in the political, geographic, cultural, and economic links between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan the two largest countries of South Asia. The two countries share much of their common geographic location, but differ starkly in religious demographics. India is a secular country with Hindu majority at about 80% of the total population and Muslims being the largest religious minority with about 13% of the population. Pakistan, on the other hand, is an Islamic country with 97% population being Muslim, and only about 1.8% Hindus. Diplomatic relations between the two are defined by the history of the violent partition of British India into these two states, and numerous military conflicts and territorial disputes thereafter. Kashmir was a princely state, ruled by a Sikh, Maharaja Hari Singh. The Maharaja of Kashmir was equally hesitant to join either India–, because he knew his Muslim subjects would not like to join a Hindu-based and Hindu-majority nation–, or Pakistan– which as a Sikh he was personally averse to. Pakistan coveted the Himalayan kingdom, while Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi and Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru hoped that the kingdom would join India. Hari Singh signed a Standstill Agreement (preserving status quo) with Pakistan, but did not make his decision by August 15, 1947.

Rumors spread in Pakistan that Hari Singh was trying to accede Kashmir to India. Alarmed by this threat, a team of Pakistani forces were dispatched into Kashmir, fearing an Indian invasion of the region. Backed by Pakistani paramilitary forces, Pashtuns invaded Kashmir in September 1947. Kashmir's security forces were too weak and ill-equipped to fight against Pakistan. Troubled by the deteriorating political pressure that was being applied to Hari Singh and his governance, the Maharaja asked for India's help.

However, the Constitution of India barred the Indian Armed Forces' intervention since Kashmir did not come under India's jurisdiction. Desperate to get India's help and get Kashmir back in his own control, the Maharaja acceded Kashmir to India (which was against the will of the majority of Kashmiris), and signed the Instrument of Accession. By this time the raiders were close to the capital, Srinagar. On October 27, 1947, the Indian Air Force airlifted Indian troops into Srinagar and made an intervention. The Indian troops managed to seize parts of Kashmir which included Jammu, Srinagar and the Kashmir valley itself, but the strong and intense fighting, flagged with the onset of winter, made much of the state impassable.

After weeks of intense fighting between Pakistan and India, Pakistani leaders and the Indian Prime Minister Nehru declared a ceasefire and sought U.N. arbitration with the promise of a plebiscite. Sardar Patel had argued against both, describing Kashmir as a bilateral dispute and its accession as justified by international law. In 1957, north-western Kashmir was fully integrated into Pakistan, becoming Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-administered Kashmir), while the other portion was acceded to Indian control, and the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Indian-administered Kashmir) was created. In 1962, China occupied Aksai Chin, the northeastern region bordering Ladakh. In 1984, India launched Operation Meghdoot and captured more than 80% of the Siachen Glacier.

Pakistan maintains Kashmiris' rights to self-determination through a plebiscite in accordance with an earlier Indian statement and a UN resolution. Pakistan also points to India's failure of not understanding its own political logic and applying it to Kashmir, by taking their opinion on the case of the accession of Junagadh as an example (that the Hindu majority state should have gone to India even though it had a Muslim ruler), that Kashmir should also rightfully and legally have become a part of Pakistan since majoirity of the people were Muslim, even though they had a Hindu ruler. Pakistan also states that at the very least, the promised plebiscite should be allowed to decide the fate of the Kashmiri people.

India on the other hand asserts that the Maharaja's decision, which was the norm for every other princely state at the time of independence, and subsequent elections, for over 40 years, on Kashmir has made it an integral part of India. This opinion has often become controversial, as Pakistan asserts that the decision of the ruler of Junagadh also adhered to Pakistan. Due to all such political differences, this dispute has also been the subject of wars between the two countries in 1947 and 1965, and a limited conflict in 1999. The state/province remains divided between the two countries by the Line of Control (LoC), which demarcates the ceasefire line agreed upon in the 1947 conflict.

Pakistan is locked in other territorial disputes with India such as the Siachen Glacier and Kori Creek. Pakistan is also currently having dialogue with India regarding the Baglihar Dam being built over the River Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan, since independence, was geo-politically divided into two major regions, West Pakistan and East Pakistan. East Pakistan was occupied mostly by Bengali people. In December 1971, following a political crisis in East Pakistan, the situation soon spiralled out of control in East Pakistan and India intervened in favour of the rebelling Bengali populace. The conflict, a brief but bloody war, resulted in an independence of East Pakistan. In the war, the Pakistani army swiftly fell to India, forcing the independence of East Pakistan, which separated and became Bangladesh. The Pakistani military, being a thousand miles from its base and surrounded by enemies, was forced to give in. Though these all create t a certain bitter past between the two great countries but still here is hope the prime minister of India has visited to Pakistan and president of Pakistan have visited India and many conferences have been going on through but sill it will take a long time to improve the cordial relation between the two countries.

Indians and Pakistanis living in the Britain are said to have friendly relations with one another. There are several of suburbs such as Harrow, Hounslow and Red Bridge where both communities live alongside each other in peace and harmony. Both Indians and Pakistanis living in the UK fit under the category of British Asian. The UK is also home to the Pakistan & India friendship forum.

‘We can also hope like that India and Pakistan should become friends. Bloodshed is not hat these two country need right now.’

Janta party chief Subramanian Swamy joins BJP

Janata Party chief Subramanian Swamy is back on the scene, telling a new story peopled by familiar characters—the Gandhi family, more specifically Congress president Sonia Gandhi and her son and party general secretary Rahul. Watching Arvind Kejriwal, information activist-turned-anti-corruption-crusader-turned-politician, grab the headlines on a daily basis, how could Swamy, who redefined the use of information in politics, sit quiet?

Swamy is often dubbed “Sherlock Swamy” for his ability to dig up all kinds of information against the who-is-who of Indian politics. Sonia Gandhi and Rahul are relatively recent targets of Swamy, whose friends and foes keep changing. He has friends in all political parties. These friendships are to a large extent seasonal. In truth, Subramanian Swamy has only one permanent friend: Subramanian Swamy; not surprisingly, the cover story on Swamy in Sunday Magazine, a weekly news magazine, in 1998 was titled, I, Me, Myself. People like P.Chidambaram, J. Jayalalithaa, M. Karunanidhi and Atal Behari Vajpayee can throw more light on this aspect of Swamy’s multifaceted personality.

Interestingly, Swamy’s allegations against the Gandhis haven’t got the treatment from the media that Kejriwal’s purported exposes did. Kejriwal’s accusations drew strong rebuttals; in the case of Swamy, Rahul Gandhi’s threat of legal action received more media attention than Swamy’s allegations.

Swamy is a politician—he is leader of the Janata Party, now a constituent of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance. Kejriwal is not yet formally a politician. People tend to disbelieve politicians, especially when they raise allegations against their opponents.

Swamy started his public life as a member of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP’s ideological parent. Later, he said one of his missions was to “free the country from the pernicious effect of the RSS...”

In his political career spanning almost four decades—he began his political life in the Sarvodaya movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan which later led to the formation of the original Janata Party in the 1970s—Swamy has never been consistent. He engaged in bitter rivalry with current Tamil Nadu chief minister Jayalalitha, but joined hands with her later.

He had a blow hot-blow cold relationship with the Gandhi family, too. Once close to Rajiv Gandhi, he became his bitterest critic. After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, Subramanian Swamy renewed his friendship with the Gandhis for a brief period—he was instrumental in the temporary friendship between Sonia Gandhi and Jayalalitha.

However, for most of his time in public life, Swamy has fought the Gandhis. Political rivals have always used Swamy’s allegations to attack the Congress presidents’ family. There were reports that the NDA government in 2001 ordered a preliminary inquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into the charges Swamy made against Sonia Gandhi. Swamy had then alleged that Sonia Gandhi’s family members in Italy received money from the KGB in Indo-Soviet trade deals and that the money was used in the 1989 general elections. Of course, the charges remained unproved.

Any allegations Swamy comes up with suffer a kind of credibility crunch for the simple reason that these are being raised by Subramanian Swamy.

Kejriwal’s apolitical status lends him more credibility with ordinary people.

While Swamy has an image of a cerebral personality—many say his intelligence has been utilized more for destructive than productive purposes—Kejriwal is considered a common man. He is certainly more amicable than Swamy, who can come across as arrogant and condescending.

Still, Swamy does have his share of victories, especially in the court rooms where he himself argues his cases. One recent victory came when the Supreme Court cancelled the 2G spectrum allocations and licences in February. It was a case in which Swamy dragged even the Prime Minister’s Office to the apex court.

To quote Swamy, “all that people want is authority. Everyone drools over the PM’s chair. Even the media have joined the bandwagon. They prop up new leaders and have favourite whipping boys who are abused for no reason... Subramanian Swamy’s name tops the list. Everyone is out to attack me.”

The fact of the matter is that anyone can be on Swamy’s own hit list, even Kejriwal.

A brief history of Telangana movement

After the formation of Andhra Pradesh state, the people of Telangana expressed dissatisfaction over the implementation of the agreements and guarantees.
In December 1968 OU students organised a rally to protest against discrimination in government jobs against Telangana people and irrigation.
Discontent intensified when some of the guarantees agreed upon were supposed to lapse in January, 1969. Student agitation for the proper implementation of the guarantees began at Osmania University in Hyderabad and spread to other parts of the region.This agitation came to an end in September 1972 with the merger of Telangana Praja Samithi with Congress and people realised that the Prime Minister was not inclined towards a separate state of Telangana.
Due to Jai Andhra agitation in the Seema-Andra region in 1973, protesting against the protections (mulki rules) given for Telangana region, the Government of India diluted the protections in Gentlemen's agreement by initiating the six point formula.
Various political parties were formed on a platform of pursuing for separate statehood for Telangana region, including the Telangana Praja Samithi party in 1969, which won 11 out of 13 Parliamentary seats in 1971

SIX POINT FORMULA ON ANDHRA PRADESH FORMATION

On 21 September 1973, a political settlement was reached with the Government of India with a Six-Point Formula. It was agreed upon by the leaders of the two regions to prevent any recurrence of such agitations in the future.

1. Accelerated development of the backward areas of the State, and planned development of the State capital, with specific resources earmarked for these purposes; and appropriate representation of such backward areas in the State legislature, along with other experts, should formulate and monitor development schemes for the areas. The formation at the State level of a Planning Board as well as Sub-Committees for different backward areas should be the appropriate instrument for achieving this objective.
2. Institution of uniform arrangements throughout the State enabling adequate preference being given to local candidates in the matter of admission to educational institutions, and establishment of a new Central University at Hyderabad to argument the exiting educational facilities should be the basis of the educational policy of the State.
3. Subject to the requirements of the State as a whole, local candidates should be given preference to specified extent in the matter of direct recruitment to (i) non-gazetted posts (other than in the Secretariat. Offices of Heads of Department, other State level offices and institutions and the Hyderabad City Police) (ii) corresponding posts under the local bodies and (iii) the posts of Tahsildars, Junior Engineers and Civil Assistant Surgeons. In order to improve their promotion prospects, service cadres should be organised to the extent possible on appropriate local basis up to specified gazetted level, first or second, as may be administratively convenient.
4. A high-power administrative tribunal should be constituted to deal with the grievances of services regarding appointments, seniority, promotion and other allied matters. The decisions of the Tribunal should ordinarily be binding on the State Government. The constitution of such a tribunal would justify limits on recourse to judiciary in such matters.
5. In order that implementation of measures based on the above principles does not give rise to litigation and consequent uncertainty, the Constitution should be suitably amended to the extent necessary conferring on the President enabling powers in this behalf.
6. The above approach would render the continuance of Mulki Rules and Regional Committee unnecessary

The Telengana issue (Hindu Article)

HARDENING STANCE: Telangana Rashtra Samiti president K. Chandrasekhara Rao with BJP leader Bandaru Dattatreya at a dharna in Hyderabad on Thursday. Both parties are firm on the demand for a separate Telangana State.    NEW DELHI: The Srikrishna Committee has favoured maintaining the status quo of a united Andhra Pradesh and described the demand for a Telangana State as the “second best option.”

In its report, which was made public on Thursday, the Committee found the option of a united Andhra Pradesh the “most workable” in the circumstances and in the best interests of the social and economic welfare of people. “In this option, it is proposed to keep the State united and provide constitutional/statutory measures to address the core socio-economic concerns about the development of the Telangana region,” it said.

The report was submitted to Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on December 30.

The 461-page report lists six options —

(I) maintaining the status quo;

(II) bifurcation of the State into Seemandhra and Telangana, with Hyderabad as a Union Territory, and the two States developing their own capitals in due course; 

(III) bifurcation of the State into the Rayala-Telangana and coastal Andhra regions, with Hyderabad being an integral part of Rayala-Telangana; 

(IV) bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh into Seemandhra and Telangana, with an enlarged Hyderabad metropolis as a separate Union Territory; 

(V) bifurcation of the State into Telangana and Seemandhra as per the existing boundaries, with Hyderabad serving as the capital of Telangana, and Seemandhra having a new capital; and

(VI) keeping the State united by simultaneously providing certain definite constitutional/statutory measures for socio-economic development and political empowerment of the Telangana region — creation of a statutorily empowered Telangana Regional Council.

Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram addresses the media in New Delhi after meeting political parties from Andhra Pradesh on the Telangana issue.    The Committee found the fifth option the “second best,” with a rider that separation “is recommended only in case it is unavoidable and if this decision can be reached amicably among all the three regions.” Considering the option of bifurcating the State into Telangana and Seemandhra as per the existing boundaries, the Committee felt that the continuing demand for a separate Telangana had some merit, and “is not entirely unjustified.” In case, this option was exercised, the apprehensions of the coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema people and others who settled in Hyderabad and other districts of Telangana about their investments, property, livelihood and employment would need to be absolutely addressed.

“Considering all aspects, the Committee felt that while the creation of a separate Telangana would satisfy a large majority of people from the region, it will also throw up several other serious problems. Therefore, after taking into account the pros and cons, the Committee did not think it to be the most preferred, but the second best option,” the report said.

Maintaining the status quo was the least-favoured option. It also found the second and third options “not practicable.” The Committee felt that the fourth option of bifurcating Andhra Pradesh into Seemandhra and Telangana, with an enlarged Hyderabad metropolis as a separate Union Territory, was likely to meet with stiff opposition from the Telangana protagonists, and it might be difficult to reach a political consensus on making this solution acceptable to all.

On the sixth option of keeping the State united, the Committee said it could be done through the establishment of a statutory and empowered Telangana Regional Council with adequate transfer of funds, functions and functionaries. “The Regional Council would provide a legislative consultative mechanism for the subjects to be dealt with by the Council.”

 
The Committee felt that with firm political and administrative management, it should be possible to convince the people of the importance keeping the State united, as this option would be in the best interests of all, and would provide satisfaction to the maximum number of people. “It would also take care of the uncertainty over the future of Hyderabad as a bustling educational, industrial and IT hub/destination.”

Dwelling further on the sixth option, it said that for managing water and irrigation resources equitably, a technical body — water management board — and an irrigation project development corporation with an expanded role were recommended. This should meet all the issues raised by the Telangana people satisfactorily, it said. Flagging socio-economic development and good governance as the core issue, the Committee, keeping the national perspective in mind, was of the considered view that “this option stands out as the best way forward.”

The five-member Committee, headed by the former Supreme Court judge, B. N. Srikrishna, was appointed on February 3, 2010. It examined in detail the issues pertaining to the current demand for a separate Telangana as well as the demand for a united State. The Committee examined all aspects of the situation. Keeping in view the local, regional and national perspectives, it gave the six options.

It examined such parameters as regional, economic and equity analysis, education and health, water resources, irrigation and power development, public employment. It also looked into the issues relating to Hyderabad and the sociological and cultural issues. In the past 11 months, it consulted representatives of industry, trade, trade unions and organisations of farmers, women and students, and all sections of the people, especially the political parties.

The National Food Security Act has failed to reform the discriminatory public distribution system

A concept note on the proposed National Food Security Act circulated to all states continues to push for a targeted public distribution system instead of a universal one, and proposes to reduce the issue of foodgrains to 25 kg per BPL household, completely ignoring the contentious issue of who is poor and what an adequate and nutritious diet consists of.

At a public hearing on the public distribution system (PDS), held before the Justice Wadhwa Committee in Bangalore in December 2008, Sarojamma, a single parent with four children (one of whom is mentally disabled) pleaded for a below the poverty line (BPL) ration card. She had been given an above the poverty line (APL) ration card as she is a garment worker earning Rs 3,500 per month. The APL ration card fetches her only kerosene and no foodgrain in Karnataka.

To be eligible for a BPL card, Sarojamma needs to be earning less than Rs 17,000 per year, or less than Rs 1,500 per month. At today’s prices, the rent alone for a measly 10 x 10 sq ft space in Bangalore is upwards of Rs 1,500 a month. So, to be considered poor, the state expects its citizens to be living on air and to have no other needs such as health and education.

Eeramma, who has been a single parent for 20 years with six children, was seen pleading for anAntyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) card that would entitle her to 10 kg more foodgrain than her BPL card. Her BPL card gets her a maximum of 25 kg of foodgrain, or around 3.5 kg per person per month for her household of seven.

Insufficient food for the poor

One would have thought one needed at least 15 kg of cereal per person per month to provide 2,400 calories per day merely to exist, let alone eat a balanced diet consisting of pulses, oil, fruit and vegetables that is necessary to grow to one’s full potential and lead a healthy life. The present PDS expects you to become food secure by merely eating an inadequate quantity of cereal!

There were others like Arthiamma and her husband, both blind, and Ritu (name changed) who is HIV+, who had been given APL cards. Their social and physical vulnerability did not make them eligible for special consideration by the state.

"Almost 50% of its children are malnourished and 75% of its women suffer from anaemia; and per capita food availability has actually decreased"

What is incredible about ‘Incredible India’ is that while it sports a high growth in GDP, it ranks 66th in a list of 88 countries on the World Hunger Index. Almost 50% of its children are malnourished and 75% of its women suffer from anaemia; and per capita food availability has actually decreased between 1991 2004-05.
“Food security refers to a situation that exists when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life,” says an FAO report ‘State of Food Insecurity in the World, 2001’.

As reflected in these examples, India’s current public distribution system does not seem to be fulfilling any of the above criteria to ensure the right to food expected of a just and humane society.

Flawed concept note

However, into this gloomy scenario comes the UPA government’s hopeful promise of enacting a National Food Security Act. A concept note on the proposed Act, circulated to all state food secretaries by the food secretary, GoI, cites the above FAO quotation and says: “To ensure food security to all citizens of the country based on a rights approach, there is need for providing a statutory basis to food security.” And, “the nutritional status of individualhousehold members is the ultimate focus,” (emphasis added).Although these pious statements give the impression that here, at last, is an attempt to address shameful deficiencies in the country’s food security situation, the rest of the concept note is more in the manner of a preamble to a National Food Insecurity Act!

While civil society is clamouring that the PDS be universalised, without any distinctions between BPL and APL, so that the poor get self-selected as it was earlier when the country was growing at the Hindu rate of growth of about 3%, the concept note seeks to make the targeted PDS statutory.

"If universalisation of the PDS is not accepted, those earning less than the minimum wage need to be considered poor"

The targeted PDS is costly and gives rise to a lot of corruption in the process of trying to decide who is and who is not poor. This results in the genuinely poor being left out whilst the ineligible get several cards. Economists like Jayati Ghosh say that the cost difference between a universal and targeted PDS is not very great. So what happens to the aim of covering all citizens?

Currently, the limits of annual income required for a household to be declared BPL are illogical. In Karnataka, for instance, the figures are Rs 11,000 and Rs 17,000 in rural and urban areas respectively. That means that a household of five people in Bangalore would have to be living on around Rs 47 per day, or about Rs 10 per person, on which even a beggar would not survive.

Rising hunger and malnutrition problem

In other words, a person would have to be earning less than half the minimum wage of Rs 88 (which itself is inadequate) to be considered poor. If universalisation of the PDS is not accepted, those earning less than the minimum wage need to be considered poor.

The concept note assumes without any justification that the nation may not be able to procure the required amount of foodgrain or bear the cost of a food subsidy. It is therefore proposing to reduce the scale of issue to 25 kg per BPL household, or 5 kg per person. This, despite the Supreme Court ruling that every BPL family shall be given 35 kg, and that no changes shall be effected in any food-related scheme without its permission. This will result in families having to buy 10 kg from the market, paying more for the same amount of food than earlier.

Taking all this into consideration, the Wadhwa Committee recommends that “the income criterion needs to be revisited” and that “estimation of poverty should not be made on a criteria (sic)which is less than the minimum wage fixed by the state for agricultural labourers”. Also, that “the government may also consider using calorie intake per person per day as an indicator of poverty”.

The People’s Health Movement has demanded that every person be given enough foodgrain to ensure 2,400 calories per day. Moreover, the predominance of cereals and lack of adequate pulses, oil, fruit and vegetables in the diet of most Indians is what is causing high levels of malnutrition among them. We need to find ways to get these items to the populace through the PDS, if malnutrition is to be addressed.

The concept note does not mention the word ‘malnutrition’ at all; it completely ignores the contentious issue of defining who is poor and how much and what constitutes ‘adequate and nutritious food’.

It does not recognise anywhere that entitlements should be linked to levels of malnutrition, if food security is to be achieved. It concentrates wholly on how to reduce the number of BPL families, reduce entitlements, and reduce subsidies. A great way indeed to ensure food security and raise India’s position on the World Hunger Index!

Binding clauses
Further, the concept note seeks to take away the freedom enjoyed by the states until now to: (1) fix the numbers of those who are BPL in their respective states; (2) decide the amount of foodgrain to be given to them, and (3) fix the rate at which these shall be provided. As a result of this freedom, the note says, the actual number of BPL ration cards issued by all the states is 10.68 crore while the accepted figure of BPL households by the Centre is 6.52 crore, resulting in an excess of 4.16 crore BPL cards. Tamil Nadu, for instance, has universalised the PDS, while Karnataka has issued BPL cards to 85% of households.

"The Centre is planning to bring in an enforcement mechanism that will monitor the states’ adherence to the Centre’s fiats and penalise those that transgress them"

The Centre is planning to curtail this right and insist that all states abide by the levels of poverty fixed by the Planning Commission, and that the Centre shall decide the numbers of poor that shall be eligible in each state, the amount of foodgrain that shall be given, and the rates at which these shall be issued to families.

To ensure that states do not defy these restrictions and fix their own entitlements, the Centre is planning to bring in an enforcement mechanism under the Food Security Act that will monitor the states’ adherence to the Centre’s fiats and penalise those that transgress them. Here is a blatant attempt not only to centralise decision-making and curtail the freedom of the states in a federal set-up, but also to reduce the basic entitlement to food of a hungry and malnourished nation.

The present allocation under the TDPS to the BPL and AYY categories is 277 lakh tonnes which entails a “huge commitment on the central pool for BPL families,” the concept note adds. The Planning Commission’s latest poverty estimates, according to 2004-05 figures, reveal that the country’s BPL population is only 27.5% whereas it was 36% according to 1993-94 figures.

As per the above, the number of BPL families (including AAY) will come down from 6.52 crore to 5.91 crore, and the number of APL families will go up from 11.52 crore to 15.84 crore. In view of this, based on the current scale of issue, annual allocations of foodgrain for AAY and BPL categories may come down from 277 lakh tonnes to 251 lakh tonnes, and for the APL category it will go up from 162 lakh tonnes to 202 lakh tonnes, the concept note estimates.

However, in view of this increase of 40 lakh tonnes for the APL category, the concept note makes the categorical statement that “the central government will not be able to guarantee distribution/supply of any quantity of foodgrain for the APL category from the central pool,” and that the “APL category may be excluded from TDPS,” except for APL families in some food-deficit and inaccessible states/union territories. This reasoning fails to recognise that there will be a saving of 26 lakh tonnes of foodgrain as a result of the reduction in BPL numbers.

The effective increase in foodgrain allocation to the APL category will thus only be 14 lakh tonnes. To use this reasoning to restrict the PDS only to 27.5% of the population is to deprive the rest of the population, which is unable to meet the requirement of 2,400 calories per day, of the right to food. Researchers like Utsa Patnaik estimate this number to be 70% of the population.

While civil society demands that BPL cards be updated every year in order to capture those who have slid back into poverty due to various exigencies like debt, drought, displacement, etc, the Centre is talking about annual updation only to seek out those who have risen above the poverty line, with the aim of taking away their BPL cards.

The concept note recognises that some households may have more than the average number of persons whereas others may have less than the average. But nowhere does the Centre make a commitment to provide foodgrain to every individual in a family, whether it has five or 10 members. It continues to think in terms of an upper ceiling of five units per household as the maximum that a family can receive. What happens to the guarantee of having the “individual as the focus”?

Schemes/ Yojana's for addressing hunger

Even more worrying seems to be the Centre’s intent to do away with other food-related schemes such as the Annapoorna Yojana for elderly destitutes and supply of foodgrain from the central pool to welfare institutions, hostels, etc, in the name of avoiding multiplicity of schemes, as beneficiaries of these schemes may already be covered under the TDPS.

By mentioning the school midday meal scheme, the ICDS scheme, and the nutrition programme for adolescent girls as schemes that cause multiplicity, the Centre is hinting that these too may be curtailed or done away with altogether. Or, at the very least, that it is keeping its options open. There goes the hope of 50% malnourished children and anaemic adolescent girls of ever leading a full and healthy life. In the same breath, the Centre is proposing that the Antyodaya sub-category within the BPL also be done away with on grounds that sub-categories are unnecessary.

"With this, the government seemingly wishes to wash its hands of any accountability ensuring the right to food to all its citizens"

The Centre doles out a plethora of excuses as to why it may not be able to obtain or sustain current levels of foodgrain procurement at minimum support prices, or sustain their distribution at current levels. And that all this uncertainty could necessitate the import of foodgrain.

The Centre also hints that if the issue price of rice and wheat are fixed at Rs 3 per kg for all BPL families, the annual food subsidy may go up from the current Rs 37,000 crore to Rs 40,380 crore. And that continuing to provide foodgrain for the APL category would further affect this figure. Nowhere is there an acceptance that these costs have to be borne as a matter of course if food security is to be ensured. The possible increase in cost is spoken of more in the nature of a looming threat to the economic health of the nation, which needs to be avoided.

The only good points in the concept note appear to be the government’s commitment to ensuring doorstep delivery of foodgrain to all fair price shops (FPSs), monitoring FPSs and certification of issuance of foodgrain by local vigilance committees, social audit by local bodies, computerisation of operations, effective grievance redressal mechanisms, and the setting up of food security tribunals at the taluka level, and appellate tribunals at the district level.

The piece de resistance of the concept note lies in the statement: “In case a state/UT government is unable to distribute the entitled monthly quantities of foodgrain to eligible BPL families/individuals, such families/individuals will be entitled for payment of a food security allowance.” With this, the government seemingly wishes to wash its hands of any accountability in the matter of ensuring the right to food to all its citizens.

Activists see the proposed Food Security Act as a gimmick to win future votes, just as the NREGA was seen as the reason for the substantial mandate given to the UPA in the last elections. The government will be seen to have done something pro-poor even though it will only be a mask behind which it quietly carries on its real agenda of neo-liberal reforms.

The Sino-Indian Border dispute: You Scratch my Back, But I Won’t Scratch yours

The two Asian Giants are still not able to figure out the line dividing them – in the longest running border dispute in modern history. This dispute offers interesting lessons on how to, and how not to, handle boundary issues. The analysis of Chinese behavior in the negotiations is doubly important given China’s perception in the west of its ‘flexing its muscles’, and China’s theory of ‘Peaceful Rise’.

About a century ago, Sir Henry McMahon, the then British Foreign Secretary, took a think red pencil and sketched a line between India and Tibet on a map - a line thathas resulted in the two most populous nations in the world going to war, costing more than 2000 lives; and that has created enormous mistrust on both sides, especially in India. 

Consequently, on the 3rd of July, 1914, was signed one of the most bizarre and controversial agreements ever known to man - The Simla accord, the complexities of which have yet to be unraveled. 
It was signed at a conference in the Indian mountain town of Simla that was attended by representatives of the British Empire, the newly founded Republic of China, and the Tibetan government at Lhasa.

It is on this extremely controversial treaty that the entire negotiating stance of the Indian government is based. It recognizes the McMahon line as the legal international boundary. The legality of the Simla accord is disputed. If it is legal, then it serves India's cause; if it is illegal, China's.
The border negotiations have been going on since 1981, making them the longest boundary negotiations in modern history.  The dubious record includes,
1)  8 rounds of senior-level talks between 1981 and 1987,
2) 14 Joint Working Group meetings between 1988 and 2002,
3) 14 rounds of talks between the designated Special Representatives since 2003.

Disputed Territories

The major territories that are disputed between these two countries can be divided into two distinct parts:

1) The Western Sector - Aksai Chin, which lies to the east of the Kashmir valley, covering an area of about 37,250 sq.km (14,380 sq.mi) - currently occupied by China.

Territories disputed between India and China

2) The Eastern Sector - Most of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, that China calls South Tibet, covering an area of 83,743 sq.km (32,333 sq.mi) - currently occupied by India.
 

China's boundary settlements with other countries

Western and Indian analysts and journalists frequently accuse China of having a new-found self-confidence, call on Obama to "burst Beijing's bubble" (The Washington Post), call its statements "harangue" and its behaviour "hubris" (The Economist), and accuse it of possessing an increased "assertiveness" (Almost everyone!).
Even a 2005 Pentagon report on Chinese military power expressed concern that “conflicts to enforce China’s [territorial] claims could erupt in the future with wide regional repercussions."

J. Mohan Malik, an expert in Asian Geopolitics and  Proliferation, proclaims, "Having wrested substantial territorial concessions from Russia, Vietnam, and Tajikistan in their land border disputes with China, Beijing is now expecting the same from India."

Although a thorough analysis of China’s border disputes merits a separate blog post, only a summary is sufficient here to put things in perspective.

China has had land border disputes with every country which it bordered. However, it has resolved 12 out of the 14 disputes quite remarkably, giving remarkable concessions in each of them.
In its border negotiations with different countries, China has pursued compromise and offered concessions in most of these conflicts. China’s compromises have often been substantial, as it has usually offered to accept less than half of the contested territory in any final settlement. It has also not reiterated its claims on a majority of the territory which was seized from it by the so-called 'unequal treaties'.

According to M.Taylor.Fravel, a premier expert on China's border disputes,

"Contrary to scholars of offensive realism, ......China has rarely exploited its military superiority to bargain hard for the territory that it claims or to seize it through force. China has likewise not become increasingly assertive in its territorial disputes as its relative power has grown in the past two decades. Contrary to others who emphasize the violent effects of nationalism, which would suggest inflexibility in conflicts over national sovereignty, China has been quite willing to offer territorial concessions despite historical legacies of external victimization and territorial dismemberment under the Qing."
 ".....China has not issued demands for large tracts of territory that were part of the Qing dynasty......"

 "China only contested roughly 7 percent of the territory that was part of the Qing dynasty at its height"

In the adjoining map, the grey area was part of the Qing dynasty during 1820, claims that China did not pursue.

China's land border negotiations with neighbouring countries offer a startling revelation. Portions of the total disputed territories that China received as part of its boundary negotiations with 12 of its 14 neighbours are as follows:

Afghanistan  -  0%

Tajikistan      - 4%

Nepal            - 6%

Burma          - 18%

Kazakhstan  - 22%

Mongolia      - 29%

Kyrgyzstan   - 32%

North Korea  - 40%

Laos             - 50%

Vietnam        - 50%

Russia          - 50%

Pakistan       - 54%

(Pakistan was a special case in which China received 60% of the disputed land but transferred 1,942 square kilometers of separate land to Pakistan. In Tajikistan’s case, the figure refers to the 28,000 sq.km of the disputed Pamir mountain range, other sectors were divided evenly. In the case of Vietnam, in addition to this settlement, China transferred, apparently without any strings attached, the White Dragon Tail Island to (North) Vietnam in 1957)

According to Fravel, "Analysis of China’s dispute behavior bears directly on the future of peace and stability in East Asia. Behavior in territorial disputes is a fundamental indicator of whether a state is pursuing status quo or revisionist foreign policies, an issue of increasing importance in light of China’s rising power."

China's recent 'assertiveness'

On a recent visit to the US, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, "There is but a certain amount of assertiveness on the Chinese part. I don't fully understand the reasons for it".

He was referring, among other things, to Chinese objections to the PM's and Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh and China's attempt to stall an ADB loan, part of which was earmarked for Arunachal Pradesh.

There has also been some media hype among the Indian media about unconfirmed reports of border incursions (which The Economist calls the 'picking up (of) fights' by China) . But since the Line of Actual Control (LAC)  is not clearly defined, incursions often take place on both sides; and it was dismissed by the Indian government as inconsequential.

Dr Fravel argues that "China has beefed up border security and associated infrastructure along all of its borders, not just the one with India." Now since its border with India is not clearly defined,  a perceived incursion to one side is simply a normal border patrol to the other. Even the Indian government has said that the LAC is perceived differently on both sides.

According to Fravel, "...often times the Indian government denies that incursions have occurred when local officials in India report that they have occurred.

What is clear is (that) Chinese activity on the border has increased in the last several years. What I mean here is the frequency of its patrols, and that in itself is threatening to India if it cannot patrol at the same level of frequency." (my emphasis)

India significantly beefed up the number of troops on its border with China after these reports.

Although this is not the appropriate place for a detailed analysis of these accusations, it is clear that China's recent behaviour does NOT indicate that it wants Arunachal Pradesh per se, it simply means that its claim is still alive, which it always was. That Arunachal Pradesh is disputed (but not Chinese per se) territory has been its official position since before the 1962 war.

China in fact only 'attacked' India in 1962 only to get it to negotiate.  After occupying Arunachal Pradesh for a short period, it declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew - thus maintaining the same status quo as that prior to the war.

'Facts of History'

History is History. It cannot be changed. But what we can change is its effect on the future. China understands this perfectly.
It refers to the McMahon line and the other aspects of the dispute as 'a fact of history' or 'a fact leftover by history' (two favourite phrases of the Chinese government). It is willing to forget history and move forward, even if it means offering significant concessions.

China seems to have mastered the art of giving remarkable concessions and settling disputes peacefully. (So much so that it seems to border on an obsession of resolving land border disputes as quickly and amicably as possible), characteristic of which is its 'One country, Two systems' approach, which resulted in the successful and peaceful transfer of Hong Kong and Macau to China. By contrast, India had to 'invade' Goa, another Portuguese colony like Macau, to liberate it.

This is in stark contrast with India, where apparently Foreign Policy is merely a vote-grubbing exercise. It would be political suicide for any Indian government if it were to 'settle' any dispute with mutual concessions. In fact, it would not be an over-exaggeration to say that while Chinese Foreign Policy is about surviving the next century, Indian Foreign Policy is about surviving the next election.

In 1960, Zhou Enlai offered Nehru a bargain that was in India's favour by a land area ratio of about 3:1 - China would drop its claim in the Eastern sector if India would drop its claim in the Western sector. But Nehru rejected this package solution, and later also refused to negotiate with the Chinese, until it vacated 'illegally occupied' Indian territory (As if there'll be anything left to negotiate then!).   

Deng Xiaoping again offered a similar deal to India on a number of occasions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but they were again rejected by India.

In contrast, India has chosen to adopt a sector-by-sector approach, negotiating each of the two distinct sectors separately.

As China expressed a willingness to drop its claim in the Eastern sector, Fravel thinks that "India believes that it can use this strategy to maximise concessions from China. Because China has already suggested dropping its claims in one sector, India can also seek concessions in the Western sector. China has opposed this and one reason why China has increased the prominence of Tawang (a district/town in Arunachal Pradesh or South Tibet with close links to Tibet) is because India prefers to pursue a sector by sector approach. China is signaling to India that if a sector by sector approach is pursued, China will expect concessions in both sectors from India." (my emphasis)

Needless to say, even in this sector-by-sector approach, there is no evidence that India is willing to offer any concessions.

In the official statements of these two countries, the differences of their respective approaches seem to stand out. While India refers to Arunachal Pradesh as an 'integral part of India', China refers to it as 'disputed territory' - thereby indicating that although China has a claim on that territory, it recognizes and respects the fact thatIndia also has a claim on it. It doesn't refer to Chinese occupied Aksai Chin as an 'integral part of China' and South Tibet (or Arunachal Pradesh) as being under 'illegal occupation' by India. 

The above facts have been completely missed by the Indian media as well as the general public and politicians, who put the blame squarely on China for the dispute remaining unresolved. 

Recently The Times of India published an article by Dilip Hiro, a journalist andanalyst specializing in India, which stated, "Although China has settled its land border disputes with all other neighbours it has refused to do so with India". Indian analysts are often quick to claim that China has 'refused' to settle its border dispute with India because it is afraid of India's rise, conveniently forgetting the fact that the same argument can apply to India too.

You can scratch my back, but I won’t scratch yours.

Historians on both sides can offer arguments and analyses to support their claims and debate till the cows come home. But while the Chinese government is willing to forget history and even recognize the McMahon line in the eastern sector, the Indian government remains stubborn, risking a political fallout and a huge backlash fueled by a brainwashed Indian public, which is in turn fueled by false and exaggerated  media reports. The current Indian government is often compelled to succumb to the people's prejudices. Nationalistic fervour and zeal run so high in Indian minds that it clouds rational thinking in the national interest.

In fact, after losing the war in 1962, Nehru and his government; along with the Indian media, succeeded in portraying India as the innocent 'victim' of Chinese 'aggression' and 'betrayal'. Even today, a look at media reports and even MP's speeches in parliament clearly shows that this fiction is still maintained in the Indian mindset.

The words of a 1964 CIA report still ring true today,

    "A political settlement, which could not be negotiated when Sino-Indian relations were still to some degree friendly, will be even less likely now that relations are completely antagonistic."

Needless to say, it is in India's long-term national interest to resolve the dispute quickly. However, it is not in the government's interest to offer any sort of compromise, and hence it wouldn't touch the issue with a bargepole (A textbook example where national interest is superceded by political interest in a democracy).

It is abundantly clear that China wants the dispute resolved as quickly as possible (For one, it doesn't have such a strong and ill-informed public opinion to contend with). It understands that friendly relations between neighbours cannot be fully achieved as long as the mutual border is not clearly demarcated. It has offered significant concessions to India, keeping only the territory that is strategically important to it (because of the Aksai Chin road). It is willing to recognize Indian claims on the populated portion of the disputed territory, keeping only the barren desert land of Aksai Chin, where according to Nehru himself, "Not even a blade of grass grows".

Unfortunately, the Indian government seems to think that it has a mandate from heaven to keep ALL the disputed territory for itself, and will not offer any concessions whatsoever. It will not accept 74% of the total disputed territory that was part of the deal offered by China (heck, it won't even accept 99.99% of the territory if China offered it!), but wants the ENTIRE disputed territory for itself!